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Perils of a Fixed Exchange Rate: The
Collapse of the Argentine Economy
Alexis Manning
I. Introduction
nce hailed as a successful model of liberal
Both loose fiscal policy, involving massive budget
economic reform, Argentina’s economy, and
deficits and a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dolconsequently the welfare of millions of
lar at par contributed to the catastrophic collapse of
people and numerous nations, exists in a precarious
Latin America’s second largest economy and richest
state, teetering on the brink of total collapse. A senation.
vere recession has plagued the Argentine economy
This paper asserts that while Argentina’s fixed
since 1998, and signs indicate that the economy will
exchange rate provided short-term economic stabilcontinue to experience a particularly rapid decline this
ity, it laid the foundation of the economy’s current
year. Unemployment has climbed to 25%, causing
collapse. A fixed exchange rate or dollarization may
the country’s once relatively large middle class, to
represent a short-term solution to rampant hyperinshrink. Over 44% of the population now subsists
flation, but it is not a long term, sustainable remedy to
below the poverty line, and this number continues to
fundamental economic problems. Argentina’s ecogrow. Forecasts project that
nomic policy sacrificed the longGDP will plummet between
term interest of a country in fa“Considering Argentina quali5% and 10% for 2002. Arvor of immediate, short-term
fied as one of the ten richest countries
gentina recently defaulted on
benefits.
in the world with living standards
its $155 billion debt, which repThis paper develops as folthat rivaled France and Germany less
resents the largest single debt
lows:
Section II briefly
than a century ago, one must wonder
default in the entire world (“A
chronicles Argentina’s recent
how the Argentine economy plumDecline without Parallel,” meted to its current dismal state.”
economic history, focusing on its
2002). The Argentine bankeconomic condition and policies
ing system is in danger of colduring the late 1980’s and early
lapsing and can only hope to survive with the aid of
1990’s, which prompt the implementation of a fixed
strong government intervention. Deteriorating ecoexchange rate. Section III utilizes formal economic
nomic conditions forced Argentina to abandon its
theory, including exchange rate models and the ASdecade-old fixed exchange rate with the dollar and
AD model, in order to analyze the effects of
devalue the peso.
Argentina’s fixed exchange rate. Section IV discusses
Considering Argentina qualified as one of the
and reviews the conclusions of other economic reten richest countries in the world with living standards
search conducted on pegged exchange rates. Secthat rivaled France and Germany less than a century
tion V examines empirical evidence regarding the efago, one must wonder how the Argentine economy
fects of the pegged exchange rate on various Argenplummeted to its current dismal state (“A Decline withtine economic variables. Section VI concludes with
out Parallel,” 2002). Although no single policy or
a concise summary of the shortcomings of fixed exevent can be identified as the sole culprit of Argentina’s
change rates, and then offers a brief discussion of
deterioration, a few factors clearly undermined ecoArgentina’s options for the future.
nomic stability and precipitated Argentina’s demise.
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and prosperity and how it eventually contributed to
the economy’s recent demise.
III. Formal Model
Nominal exchange rates, which are generally
market-determined, measure the price of one currency in terms of another. The nominal exchange rate
changes in the short run as the real exchange rate,
domestic inflation, or foreign inflation varies. Inflation
will cause depreciation, thus reducing the purchasing
power of that currency, which reflects the Argentine
economy during the 1980’s. All other factors held
constant, hyperinflation will cause a large upward shift
in the Argentine expected return curve, because inflation erodes purchasing power, creating depreciation.
This effect is depicted in the shift from R (A) curve to
R1(A). The US expected return curve will experience a small leftward shift as seen in the movement
from I (US) to I1(US) due to the higher nominal interest rates in Argentina that make Argentine financial
assets more attractive. However, the first effect dominates, and hyperinflation will cause the peso to deFigure 1: Inflation and Exchange Rate

Pesos / $

II. Overview of Agentina’s Recent Economic
History
The 1980’s represented a very volatile period for the Argentine economy, which creates the
desire, and perhaps even a need for an exchange rate
pegged at par to the dollar. The country endured two
severe bouts with hyperinflation during which inflation skyrocketed into the quadruple digits on several
occasions. This exponentially increasing inflation,
which reached 3,066% in 1989, imposed serious costs
upon households and businesses (Cooper, 2001).
Some businesses closed their doors, posting signs stating “We have no prices,” because they could not accurately predict and mark up prices quickly enough
(Anderson, 1999). Employees demanded frequent
payment, and then quickly spent or converted their
wages. Both businesses and households reduced
currency holdings, and the US dollar served as the
preferred medium of exchange and store of value
(Cardoso, 1992). Both domestic and foreign investment plunged, and capital flight occurred. Large government deficits, which occurred in the absence of
investment, further encouraged inflation. Prices failed
to serve as signals for resource allocation and therefore, market forces could not reach an efficient outcome. As a result, productivity decreased, and GDP
dropped 4% in 1990 (“A Decline without Parallel,”
2002). The diminishing productivity capabilities of
Argentina as well as the minimal consumer and investor confidence contributed to two severe recessions
in the 1980’s, and unemployment afflicted a quarter
of the population. The combined effect of high inflation with high unemployment, a phenomenon known
as stagflation, crippled the Argentine economy.
In order to combat hyperinflation and promote economic growth, Carlos Menem, the former
President of Argentina, and his economic minister,
Domingo Cavallo, created the Currency Board in
1991, which became the cornerstone for the revival
of the Argentine economy. The Currency Board
pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a oneto-one ratio by law, known as the Convertibility Law
(Allen, 2002). The Currency Board supported this
fixed exchange rate by accumulating US dollars and
other strong foreign currencies in its reserve. Fixing
the exchange rate immediately halts inflation and restores economic growth. However, the fixed exchange
rate creates the origins of future economic problems.
The following models explain how Argentina’s fixed
exchange rate created short-term economic stability

I1(US) I (US)

R1(A)

R (A)

Expected Return US
preciate against the dollar, as seen in figure 1.
Inflation negatively impacts the economy and
will decrease output, which can be seen using the
Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand (AS-AD)
model. Inflation will increase the cost of inputs, which
will cause the short run aggregate supply (SRAS) curve
to shift left, which increases the price level and decreases output, as illustrated in figure 2. In summation, the hyperinflation of the 1980’s in Argentina
caused the depreciation of the peso, an increase in
The Park Place Economist Volume XI
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Figure 2: Hyperinflation and Recession during
1980’s
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price level and a decrease in output.
A fixed exchange rate occurs when a government sets and maintains the exchange rate at predetermined levels. If an inflation-prone currency, such
as the Argentine peso, is pegged to a stable currency,
such as the US dollar, then the Argentine money supply will stabilize and inflation will significantly drop. A
fixed exchange rate prevents excessive money growth,
because the country must maintain the predetermined
convertibility. As long as US monetary growth is not
excessive, Argentina’s currency will remain stable.
Neither appreciation nor depreciation will occur under a fixed exchange rate. Figure 3 illustrates the
effects of a fixed exchange rate in terms of the AS-

Price Level

Figure 3: Fixed Exchange rate in 1991
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Y
AD model.
The initial drop in inflation produced by the
fixed exchange rate will decrease the price of inputs,
causing the SRAS curve to shift right and price level
26
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will fall, while output increases. The decrease in money
supply will cause the AD curve to shift left, further
decreasing the price level and creating a small decrease in output. As a whole, the Argentine fixed
exchange rate will decrease the price level and increase output. In addition, a fixed exchange rate will
initially lower domestic interest rates, because both
inflation and inflationary expectations decrease. Consequently, both domestic and foreign investment will
increase and borrowing/lending by households, firms,
and government will reemerge, thus promoting economic growth. A credible fixed exchange rate will
effectively the eliminate exchange rate risk with respect to the US dollar, which will further promote
foreign investment.
However, a fixed exchange rate must remain
constant despite changing economic conditions. Overvaluation often occurs when weak currencies are
pegged to strong currencies. As a direct result of the
implementation of the fixed exchange rate, the peso
greatly appreciated in order to achieve the one-toone convertibility with the US dollar. If a currency
appreciates, then the country’s exports will become
more expensive and net exports will decrease. In
addition, a country must relinquish all monetary and
exchange rate policy in favor of the rigidly fixed exchange rate. Consequently, a country with a pegged
exchange rate cannot effectively combat external
shocks. External shocks to the Argentine economy,
such as Mexico’s financial crisis, the devaluation of
the Brazilian real, the appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies, and increasing capital costs
caused the economy to contract and create depreciative pressures upon the peso (“A Decline without
Parallel,” 2002). In order to combat depreciation
pressures and maintain the fixed exchange rate, the
government will purchase its own currency with dollars and raise interest rates. Due to increasing interest rates, investment will decrease and capital flight
will occur in expectation of depreciation, which in turn,
decreases credit availability. The decrease in investment and net exports will cause AD to shift left, decreasing output and lowering the price level as depicted in Figure 4.
However, the government cannot devalue the
currency to make its goods more competitive abroad
nor can it use monetary policy to stimulate the
economy. The government lacks the necessary tools
to effectively manage a recession (Murphy, 2001).
The government may utilize fiscal policy to stimulate
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Figure 4: Collapse of the Argentine Economy
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the economy, though large government deficits encourage inflation, which serves to increase depreciation pressure (Salma, 1993). Nonetheless, economies with fixed exchange rates will experience severe
recessions in response to external shocks.
IV. Previous Research
Both economic theory and case studies clearly
indicate that a fixed exchange rate can effectively eliminate hyperinflation, and thus provide economic stability and growth in the short run. Fixed exchange
rates and dollarization help to break the self-perpetuating cycle of hyperinflation, and some economists
view these policies as the only viable solution for many
of the inflation-prone Latin American countries.
Dollarization involves fixing a currency to the US dollar regardless of market influences. Currency boards
create credibility, which many Latin American countries lack due to recent histories of hyperinflation
(Salma, 1993). Until recently, many economists extolled Argentina as the success story of Latin America
and viewed the Argentine currency board as the foundation of the country’s seven years of economic growth
(Murphy, 2001).
According to economic research, small open
economies, heavily dependent upon trade with the
US, will experience the most success from dollarization
or an exchange rate pegged to the dollar. Examples
of successful dollarization include Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama (Von Furstenber, 2000). However,
the Argentine economy is much larger and essentially
a closed economy, considering that consumption rep-

resents 83% of GDP. Therefore, many economists
viewed the Argentine peg as unsustainable (Anderson, 1999).
Historically, larger economies have failed to
maintain fixed exchange rates for more than a decade. Economists cite the loss of monetary independence, which reduces the ability of a country to respond to external shocks, as the primary drawback
of a fixed exchange rate (Gajewski, 2001). In retrospect, Argentina’s fixed exchange rate should have
served as an intermediate step to control hyperinflation. A fixed exchange rate cannot create long run
economic prosperity nor can it replace healthy macroeconomic policy. The thesis of this paper, which
asserts that Argentina’s fixed exchange rate undermined long run economic welfare for short run benefits, supports these conclusions.
V. Evidence and Results
Empirical evidence supports the assertion that
a fixed exchange rate can effectively combat hyperinflation, thus providing economic stability. Immediately following the implementation of the fixed exchange rate, inflation plummeted from the quadruple
digits to less than 1% in 1991, which is one of the
lowest rates in the world (Anderson, 1999). The inflation rate averaged around 4% while the peso remained pegged to the dollar during the 1990’s.
Argentina’s pegged exchange rate achieved its primary goal of immediate price stabilization.
Statistical data also confirms that a fixed exchange rate can promote economic growth in the short
run. During the 1980’s, GDP declined annually at a
rate of 1.1% due to recessions and economic instability. Following the implementation of the fixed exchange rate, GDP increased 10.6% in 1991 (Anderson, 1999). GDP growth averaged 6.1% from 1991
to 1997, the highest in Latin America, thus securing
seven years of economic growth (“A Decline without
Parallel,” 2002). The fixed exchange rate promoted
economic growth, because it restored confidence in
the Argentine economy by achieving price stability.
Interest rates fell from 69.2% in ’91 to 6.8% in ’98
(Anderson, 1999). Lower interest rates and a stable
economy spurred a large increase in both domestic
and foreign investment. Capital rapidly flowed into
Argentina following the implementation of the fixed
exchange rate, which helped promote economic
growth (Gajewski, 2001). Productivity also increased
as investment modernized both the industrial and agThe Park Place Economist Volume XI
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ricultural, sectors further increasing GDP.
Argentine economic variables support the
conclusion that a fixed exchange rate can jeopardize
long-term economic welfare. In order to achieve a
one-to-one convertibility ratio, the peso had to appreciate significantly. The fixed exchange rate, which
forced the relative appreciation of the peso, caused
Argentine goods to become relatively more expensive abroad due to the peso’s inflated value. Consequently, net exports decreased from a record trade
surplus of $8.3 billion during 1990 to a deficit just
two years later (“Argentina: History in the Making?”
1992). A decrease in exports hinders the growth of
GDP, which negatively impacted the Argentine
economy.
Although low interest rates helped create economic
growth, low interest rates and newly available credit
allowed the Argentine government to accumulate a
very large debt, totaling $155 billion. Debt composed
34% of GDP in ’91 and then rose to 51% by ’99.
The large government debt placed a strain upon the
economy, because it consumed a large portion of GDP,
which could have been used to stimulate the economy.
Debt servicing composed 25% of government expenditure and 3% of GDP in ’98 (Anderson, 1999).
In order to maintain the overvalued peso
against depreciation pressures, the government raised
interest rates and purchased its own currency with
dollars. In addition, the sale of dollars reduced the
central bank international reserves, causing the cause
interest rate to increase and money supply to fall.
Interest rates, which hovered around 6% from 1996
to 2000, rapidly rose to 45% 2001 (Latin Focus,
2002). Due to increasing interest rates and falling
investor confidence, investment growth rate decreased
from 17.7% in 1997 to –12.6% in 1999 (Latin Focus, 2002). Evidence indicates that the one-to-one
peg overvalued the peso. Although officially one peso
could be exchanged for one dollar, the market suggested otherwise. The peso interest rate surcharge
of 500 basis points over the dollar casts doubts on
the one-to-one convertibility (Von Furstenber, 2002).
Evidence also indicates that Argentina’s fixed exchange
rate compromised its ability to respond to external
shocks, which caused severe contractions in the Argentine economy. As a result of Mexico’s devaluation of the peso, the Argentine economy suffered and
GDP contracted 5% in ‘95. When Brazil devalued
the real in ‘98, once again, Argentina fell into a recession (Gajewski, 2001). Despite large, often irrespon28
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sible government investment and expenditures, aggressive expansionary fiscal policy failed to stimulate
the economy. Since the fixed exchange rate eliminated monetary policy as an option, the government
continued to futilely rely upon ineffective fiscal policy.
Eventually, rapidly deteriorating economic conditions,
forced Argentina to default on its $155 billion debt in
January of 2002, which represents the largest single
default in the world (“A Decline without Parallel,”
2002).
Due to the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions
and the obviously overvalued state of the peso, the
president of Argentina, Eduardo Duhalde devalued
the peso to a 1.4 exchange rate in January of 2002.
Currently, the economy remains in a recession with
unemployment reaching 25%. Forecasts predict that
the recession will worsen, and GDP will decrease 5%10% in 2002 (“A Decline without Parallel,” 2002).
Argentina’s experience indicates that a fixed exchange
rate can produce disastrous effects upon an economy
in the long run.
VI. Conclusion And Policy Implications
In hindsight, Argentina’s situation clearly illustrates the dangers of relying heavily upon a rigidly
fixed exchange rate for prolonged periods of time.
While a fixed exchange rate can effectively eliminate
hyperinflation, thus promoting economic growth in the
short run, it can create acute economic problems in
the long run. A fixed exchange rate can decrease a
country’s competitiveness abroad and it relinquishes
control of monetary policy. Consequently, a fixed
exchange rate compromises a country’s ability to cope
with adverse shocks to the economy. Argentina’s
downfall was not that it chose to adopt a fixed exchange rate in order to combat severe hyperinflation,
but that it failed to modify this policy as the economic
conditions changed. A fixed exchange rate can serve
as an intermediate step towards economic development, but it is not a panacea for irresponsible government spending or other fundamental macroeconomic
problems.
Unavoidably, Argentina will have to modify
its monetary policies, including former exchange rate
policies, as well as address more fundamental economic problems, such as imprudent government
spending, ineffective tax collection, and inflexible labor markets. In terms of currency reform, Argentina
has already devalued its peso, though further devaluation appears inevitable. If Argentina adopts a float-
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ing, market-based currency, it could utilize monetary
policy to help manage the country’s prolonged recession. In addition, Argentina’s recent default of $155
billion emphasizes the country’s need for fiscal reform. In order to promote the future economic welfare of Argentina, the country must begin repairing its
reputation and establishing its potential among investors, banks, and governments. Perhaps most important, Argentine politicians must regain the trust of its
people in both the government and the economy, in
order to achieve economic recovery and eventual
prosperity. Although Argentina’s economic recovery
will inevitably involve hardship, hope exists for this
country. According to the World Bank, Argentina’s
productive potential is “unsurpassed in Latin America”
(“Argentina: History in the Making?” 1992).
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